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Abstract This study produces an attempt to estimate the cost of future global energy supplies. The
approach chosen to address this concern relies on a comparative static exercise of estimating the cost
of three energy scenarios representing dierent energy futures. The rst scenario, the business as usual
scenario, predicts the future energy-mix based on the energy plans held by major countries. The second
scenario is the renewable energy scenario, where as much of the primary energy supply as possible is
replaced by renewable energy by 2050. The cost of the renewable energy generating technologies and
their theoretical potential are taken into account in order to create a plausible scenario. The third
scenario, the nuclear case, is based on the use of nuclear and renewable energy to replace fossil-fuels by
2050. Endogenous learning rates for each technology are modeled using an innovative approach where
learning rates are diminishing overtime. It results from the analysis that going fully renewable would cost
between -0.4 and 1.5% of the global cumulated GDP over the period 2009-2050 compared to a business
as usual strategy. An extensive use of nuclear power can greatly reduce this gap in costs.
Key words primary energy supply, experience curve, scenario
1 Introduction
No agreement on the economical feasibility of replacing fossil-fuels with renewable energy has been reached
to the present day [Brian, 2011]. A possible approach in measuring the cost of switching completely to
renewables is to create dierent scenarios and compare their respective cost. Such scenarios usually
forecast future energy costs by modeling endogenous learning as a way of justifying planned cost decrease
overtime. The aim of this study is to discuss the tools needed to determine the cost of a scenario and
their applicability. In addition, an alternative approach to forecast future technology costs is proposed.
Three scenarios representing possible energy futures over the period 2009-2050 are created and the
following technologies are included in dening the energy mix of each scenario: black coal, natural gas
and oil, nuclear, geothermal, modern biomass, onshore and oshore wind power, solar photovoltaic (PV),
concentrated solar power (CSP) and small and large hydropower. The rst scenario is a business-as
usual scenario, which is built on past trends and includes major countries current energy strategy when
forecasting the evolution of the total primary energy supply (TPES) until 2050. The second scenario is a
nuclear scenario, where countries would meet the future gap between the primary energy supplied by the
existing infrastructure and the forecasted primary energy demand, exclusively using nuclear or renewable
energy. The third and nal scenario, involves a near complete switch to renewable energy by 2050. All
scenarios take the potential of renewable energy as well as feasible deployment rates for renewable energy
into account. The existing energy infrastructure is progressively phased-out throughout the scenarios as
it reaches the end of its economical life.
A number of elements are needed in order to create a scenario and estimate its cost. In particular,
estimates on current energy costs are made using the levelized costs of energy approach, and future energy
costs are predicted by using an innovative approach minimizing the drawbacks of existing techniques for
forecasting future energy costs. In this study, future energy costs are predicted via traditional single-factor
1Accepted for publication in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews.
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learning curve combined with a diminishing learning rate. The total cost of each scenario is eventually
given as a share of the cumulative GDP over the 2009-2050 time period.
The three scenarios are introduced in Section 2. Methodologies used to estimate current and future
energy costs are described in Section 3. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4, which is followed
by a conclusion in Section 5.
2 Scenarios
There exist several types of scenario which dier based on their purpose. The category of scenario aiming
at describing plausible futures is referred to as being explorative [Bakken, 2012]. These scenarios are
quantitative and consistency throughout the scenarios can therefore be ensured. Explorative scenarios
are based on current trends and possible futures diverge based on a limited number of factors. Our
scenarios cover the period 2009-2050 and explore possible futures: the business as usual scenario, the
renewable energy scenario and the nuclear scenario.
Population, future GDP and total primary energy supply (TPES henceforth) forecasts are common
to all scenarios. Global population is expected to reach over nine billion humans in 2050 [UN, 2003,
USCB, 2012]. GDP forecasts are obtained by using 2009 numbers [IEA, 2011] and assuming a steady
3% growth rate. Estimates on the future TPES are obtained by combining population forecasts and
forecasted growth rate in average power consumption per capita. In this study, we assume that global
energy consumption initially increases by 0.9% and declines by one percent annually until the end of the
scenarios in order to reect a slowdown in the growth of the average power consumed per capita in the
long run. As a result of these assumptions, and combined to forecasts on future population growth, the
TPES is expected to increase by 70% over the time period considered. Simultaneously, the average power
consumption per capita increases from 2.42 to 2.8 kW between 2009 and 2050. Though the dierence in
average power consumption per capita between regions is not discussed in details here, the transition to
2.8 kW could be done in several ways. For instance, partial convergence in average power consumption
per capita could take place, which implies that power consumption would decrease in developed countries
and increase in developing countries. Using growth in average power consumption per capita rather than
growth in TPES leads to slightly higher forecasts than those obtained in other studies (see Table 1).
Comparison
Study Name of scenario Final year TPES in mtoe TPES in TW
IEA [2011]
New policies 2035 17,000 22.6
Current policies 2035 18,300 24.3
450 2035 14,900 19.8
Shell [2009]
Scramble 2050 21,000 27.9
Blue 2050 18,400 24.4
EC [2006] Reference 2050 22,300 29.6
This study
2035 19,800 26.3
2050 24,600 32.7
Table 1: Forecasted TPES compared to other studies.
Locked-in power exists in all scenarios because existing power plants (and plants under construction)
are kept in operation until the end of their economic plant life, because it is deemed not socially optimal
to replace existing plants before the end of their economic plant lives. The quantity of locked-in power
2In 2009, the TPES was equal to 16.3 TW [IEA, 2011] which is comparable to an average power consumption per capita
of 2.4 kW.
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is slightly exaggerated in order to allow the renewable energy technologies to ll the gap between the
locked-in power and the TPES needed without requiring unrealistic diusion rates in the renewable energy
scenario. The power locked-in is the same in all scenarios and its cost is not part of each scenario's nal
cost. The aim of this study is therefore to estimate the cost of the power needed to meet the gap between
the quantity of power locked-in and the demand for primary energy. The evolution of the contribution of
various technologies to the TPES in the three scenarios is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Evolution of the main technologies under the three scenarios.
The business as usual scenario predicts a future energy-mix incorporating major countries' current
energy strategy and their recent past actions. Coal remains a key energy source throughout this scenario
because it is among the cheapest source of energy in numerous countries and economically recoverable coal
reserves will suce to meet the demand for the upcoming decades. Unless externalities are included in the
cost of energy, there is little reason to believe that the attractiveness of coal at a global level will decrease
in the near future. Regarding the other fossil fuels, oil is expected to remain an important fuel, although
the use of oil eventually declines due to limited proven reserves. The use of natural gas is forecasted to
increase with the emergence of unconventional natural gas and potentially decreasing natural gas prices.
Overall, the TPES share from the various fossil fuels is expected to decrease from 81% in 2009 [IEA,
2011] to 70% in 2050. The evolution of the nuclear-based energy supply is less straightforward. Several
countries relying on nuclear energy have decided to phase out their nuclear reactors after the 2011 nuclear
accident in Japan. At the same time, India [Indian Nuclear Agency, 2012] and especially China [Chinese
Nuclear Agency, 2012] have plans to signicantly expand their eet of nuclear reactors due to increasing
energy needs and shortage of domestic fossil fuels. China alone is planning to build 400 GW of new
nuclear capacity by 2050 [Chinese Nuclear Agency, 2012]. Taking these dierent trends into account, the
share of nuclear in the nal TPES is expected to reach 7% at the end of the scenario. Modern renewables
are playing an increasingly important role as to account for 20% of the global TPES in 2050. Solar alone
would contribute for 3% and wind for 6% of the 2050 TPES. This evolution would mostly be driven by
the eorts of the European Union to achieve a more sustainable primary energy supply in the case of solar
3
power and to increasing competitiveness for wind power. In order to achieve such a share, a yearly growth
rate of 12% of the yearly installed capacity is needed for solar PV and 20% in the case of concentrated
solar power (CSP). These growth rates include the replacement of the plants that are decommissioned at
the end of their economic lives.
The second scenario is the renewable energy scenario and the aim in this future is to supply as much
of the 2050 primary energy supply with renewable energy as possible. How much energy can be obtained
from the various renewables depends on their potential. The existing literature [de Vries et al., 2007,
IPCC, 2011, Krewitt et al., 2009, Moriarty et al., 2012] converges towards a feasible potential of 1.5 TW
for hydropower and of more than 50 TW for direct solar power. We will consequently use these as limits to
how much power can be obtained from these energy sources. The global sustainable potential of bioenergy
is uncertain, and varies in reports from a few TW [de Vries et al., 2007, IPCC, 2011, Moriarty et al.,
2012] to 40-50 TW [Moriarty et al., 2012]. We estimate the resource potential to be of approximately 5
TW because of the following considerations. About 13% of the world surface area is considered arable
land and another 40% is covered by forests. It thus seems reasonable that in an optimal situation, parts
of the waste of the human agriculture production and parts of the world forest areas can be used in
bioenergy production. We estimate that between 5% and 10% (i.e. 7.5%) of the world's surface area can
be taken and turned into sustainable bioenergy production. In addition, we know that the power possible
to extract per area from biomaterials depends on latitude, from up to 1 Wm 2 in rain forests region
near the Equator to 0.1 Wm 2 or less in northern and southern regions. By taking an average energy
production of 0.5 Wm 2 the global bioenergy potential becomes:
Pbio = 0:5Wm
 2  7:5%  30%  4R2Earth  5TW: (1)
The total theoretical available wind energy potential on earth, i.e. the total power originating from
solar radiation and deposited in near surface wind energy is rather well known [Gustavson, 1979] and is
about 1:3  1014 W, which corresponds to 0.5% of the incoming solar radiation. The technical potential
of wind energy is much more uncertain and it ultimately depends on how much land or sea can be
transformed into working wind farms. In contrast to bioenergy which is harvested from ten percent of the
world's arable or forest covered regions, ten percent of the land area for wind farms is assumed to be of
an order of magnitude too large. One has to neglect urban areas, arctic regions, high altitude regions and
similar due to dierent constraints, technical and/or political. Using a modest 2-3 percent of the world
total land area results in a total technical potential of about 3 TW. In a thorough analysis, Hoogwijk
et al. [2004] calculated the technical potential of global onshore wind energy to about 2-6 TW. We will
adopt the upper region of this estimate by opening for the possibility that also oshore wind energy may
be established at a sizable degree. Thus we assume the technical potential of wind energy to be about
5 TW as well. The case of geothermal is particularly uncertain with estimates ranging from 0.03 TW
[Moriarty et al., 2012] to 158 TW [Krewitt et al., 2009]. In the context of this study, we retain a low
resource potential of 1 TW for geothermal. Finally, some technologies (e.g.: ocean power) relying on
non-negligible resources are being left out of the scenarios, because these are currently too expensive or
because they have not penetrated the market yet.
At the end of the renewable energy scenario, fossil fuels account for only 3% of the TPES, due to the
power locked-in. The share of non-solar renewable technologies reaches 44% and solar technologies are
needed to match energy supply and demand, because of the other renewables limited potential. By 2050,
the total solar PV installed capacity reaches slightly less than 44 TW . Compared to the 2009 installed
PV capacity of 21 GW, 44 TW means that the existing capacity at the end of 2009 needs to be multiplied
by 2,000 times over a period of 40 years. Said otherwise, an average yearly growth rate of 21% needs to
be sustained over the following four decades, which remains signicantly below the yearly growth rate of
2010, 2011 and 2012. Wind power (both onshore and oshore) is the second largest contributor to the
TPES in 2050. Yearly installed wind capacity increases progressively to reach 480 GW of added onshore
wind power capacity in 2050, which appears to be feasible because it represents 'only' ten times the new
installed capacity in 2012. Biomass eventually contributes to 18% of the TPES. Finally and even though
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their feasible potential is fully exploited by 2050, geothermal (4% of the TPES) and hydropower (4%)
play a lesser important role.
A third option can be envisaged to address the issues of climate change and the rarefaction of fossil-fuel
resources: nuclear energy. In the nuclear scenario, countries avoid using fossil-fuels by relying on nuclear
power and renewable technologies. The evolution in the use of nuclear power implies that inhabitants
in developed countries shift their mindsets in favor of nuclear power, that pro-nuclear countries such as
China and India set even higher targets and that other developing countries start their nuclear program.
In this scenario, nuclear power supplies about 22% of the total primary energy in 2050. The use of nuclear
power limits the need for costly renewable technologies.
3 Methodology
3.1 Estimates of current energy costs
We rely on the levelized cost of energy (LCOE henceforth) approach to estimate the current cost of the
various energy technologies included in this study. Data on overnight costs, operation and maintenance
costs, electrical conversion eciencies and load factors are taken from a joint report by the IEA/NEA
[2010], whereas fuel costs have been recalculated using more recent data. All monetary values are given
in 2008Euro.
The LCOE of the various energy generating technologies is illustrated in Fig. 2a. In addition to the
technologies presented in that gure, the cost of oil is estimated to be of 64 Euro/MWh3. Large dier-
ences in costs can be observed, with conventional fossil-based technologies being cheaper than renewable
technologies, with the exception of large hydropower and, to some extent, modern biomass. Among the
technologies which have not reached grid-parity in terms of costs, onshore wind, biomass and some cases
of small hydro are closer to grid-parity on a pure cost basis than the existing solar and oshore wind
technologies.
3.2 Forecasting future energy costs
Costs detailed in Fig. 2a may not be representative of future energy costs, because economies of scale, up-
sizing of technologies and learning eects [Arzivu et al., 2011] via increasing volumes will lead to reduced
costs overtime. It was already in the 1930s that hints on a relationship between costs and cumulative
production were identied [Ferioli et al., 2009, Wright, 1936] and in the mid-60s, the Boston Consulting
Group named this relationship the experience curve. Such curves are decreasing linear relationship be-
tween the double-logarithmic scales of unit costs and cumulative volumes. The equation related to the
experience curve is of the type:
Y = a Xb (2)
Where Y is the cumulative average cost per unit, X is the cumulative number of units produced, a
is the cost required to produce a unit at a starting point and b is the slope of the function when plotted
on a double logarithmic scale. Eq. (2) is a typical example of a single-factor experience curve. Multi-
factors experience curves introduce multiple factors to account for learnings induced by R&D, scaling and
learning-by-doing. Though the latter type of experience curve is more precise, it suers from the diculty
to clearly distinguish between these eects. Moreover, estimating key parameters can be arduous [Yeh
and Tubin, 2012], due to the availability and quality of the data. The single-factor experience curve is
thus simpler in the sense that only a limited number of parameters are needed for forecasting future
costs. It is however subject to a risk of omitted variable bias [Lindman and Soederholm, 2012] and it
has the tendency of generating higher learning rates than the multiple-factors experience curve [Lindman
3The 2012 price of oil turns around 100 USD/bbl or 65 2008Euro/bbl. Assuming that the cost of fuel accounts for 60% of
the LCOE (same as for the other fossil-based technologies), the full LCOE reaches 64 Euro/MWh.
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Figure 2: a. Median levelized cost of energy (LCOE), including the max and minimum LCOE for various
energy generating technologies. b. Final median LCOE at the end of the three scenarios.
and Soederholm, 2012]. The single-factor experience curve has been applied to numerous products,
processes and technologies to draw forecasts on future costs [Ferioli et al., 2009] and it is used by many
to justify continued support towards renewable energy generating technologies since future cost decreases
are expected.
Estimates on the learning rates for one technology can show substantial variation, a known issue
which arises from the use of dierent datasets, geographical areas or dependent variable [McDonald and
Schrattenholzer, 2001]. It is an indication that these learning rates must be treated with care. It however
emerges from the existing literature [Arzivu et al., 2011, Jamasb, 2007, Kahouli-Brahmi, 2008, Timilsina
et al., 2012] that mature technologies such as conventional technologies have smaller learning rates than
newer technologies.
The main problem associated to the use of Eq. (2) for forecasting future costs is that this method
relies on a constant learning rate. Costs are therefore assumed to be ever-decreasing [van der Zwaan et
al., 2002] and applying this approach to our scenario would lead to improbable results. Taking the case of
onshore wind power in the renewable energy scenario, a strong and fast increase in the use of this energy
source is envisaged for the future (see Fig. 3) and future onshore wind power costs in 2050 would be
as low as 30 Euro/MWh (see Fig. 4). Such low cost can be challenging to justify since it is as low as
the current LCOE for large hydropower with reservoir. This result is rendered possible precisely because
production costs are assumed to be ever-decreasing, hence the thought that experience curves perform
poorly in the long run. Several aspects exist which challenge the assumption of ever-decreasing costs.
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For example, some of the decrease in cost can be attributed to cost-ecient technological improvement,
leading to higher technical eciency levels. Laws of physics however impose a limit on the maximum
eciency reachable and progresses towards this limit are bound to slow down in the future. Based on this
example, it is plausible to assume that learning is more challenging to obtain in the long run [Lindman
and Soederholm, 2012], assertion supported by the fact that learning rates estimates are lowest for mature
technologies. Although the use of experience curves for forecasting future costs is sometimes criticized
[Nordhaus, 2009], it still remains popular [Yeh and Tubin, 2012] and research is ongoing to create an
approach that can generate plausible long-term forecasts.
Figure 3: Commissioning and decommissioning of onshore wind power.
[Ferioli et al., 2009] proposed an approach which mitigates the limitations associated to the use of
experience curves by introducing a component-learning hypothesis. Learning is not uniform for each
component and splitting the experience curve into a component subject to learning and a component
in which cost remains constant forever reects this fact. The relationship between cost and cumulative
capacity in a double logarithmic scale becomes convex and there is a point in time, named senescence,
when costs stop decreasing. An alternative approach is introduced here, which tackles the issue of ever-
decreasing costs and retains the straightforward aspect of the basic experience curve. The equation used
to model future costs in this study is detailed below:
Yt = Yt 1 

Xt
Xt 1
bt
bt = log2(1  lt)
lt = lt 1 

(1  d)log2

Xt
Xt 1

(3)
where lt is the learning rate at time t and d is a rate at which learning diminishes. With this approach,
the learning rate diminishes overtime to reect that learning is more challenging to obtain in the long
term. This rate is initially set to 10%. A sensitivity analysis will later be provided to show the impact of
changing this rate on the nal cost of each scenario. The forecasted levelized costs of onshore wind power
using this alternative approach and an initial learning rate of 15%, are reproduced in Fig. 4.
In this example, the estimated LCOE of onshore wind power amounts to 86 Euro/MWh. As cumulative
capacity increases, the cost of onshore wind power decreases (though at a decreasing rate) to reach 41
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Figure 4: Forecasted LCOE with: a. Pure experience curve and b. Experience curve with a diminishing
learning rate.
Euro/MWh in 2050, which appears more realistic than the 30 Euro/MWh obtained with the traditional
experience curve. It is now possible to compute the cost of building and operating the onshore wind
power capacity illustrated in Fig. 4. In this particular case, the cost of wind power between 2009 and
2050 amounts to 2:6 1013 Euro. This number is obviously dicult to interpret and a more understandable
approach is to compare this number to the forecasted world GDP over the whole time period. The cost of
onshore wind power represents 0.7% of the cumulated world GDP and the contribution of onshore wind
to the nal TPES reaches 11%. The forecasted costs of the various technologies at the end of all scenarios
are illustrated in Fig. 2b.
3.3 Remaining assumptions
Other elements are needed to make quantitative estimates possible, including some assumptions on initial
technology costs and learning rates. The median LCOE, load factor and the learning rate for each
technology retained for this study are shown in Table 2.
The median cost is chosen as a measure of the cost of the various technologies at the beginning
of the study. Integrating dierent costs for a single technology would imply to properly estimate cost
supply curves for each technology [de Vries et al., 2007], estimates that are not necessarily available or
straightforward to obtain. Learning rates are based on the work from Neij [2009] because she combines
experience curves and bottom-up assessments (i.e.: expected technological development) in estimating
them. A learning rate of 0% is assumed for the fossil-fuel technologies, geothermal and hydropower,
because fossil-fuel based capacity has been installed in large quantities and the cumulative capacity is not
expected to increase by many folds in the future. In addition, the fuel, the cost of which is expected to
increase, constitutes a large share of the overall cost. Therefore, the potential for further cost decrease is
limited [Ferioli et al., 2009]. The cost of geothermal is not expected to decrease signicantly because no
major technological innovation is expected in the future. The cost of large hydropower is not expected to
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Technology LCOE Load factor Learning rate
Large hydro 30 60% 0%
Geothermal 34 85% 0%
Black coal 46 85% 0%
Nuclear 51 85% 4%
Natural gas 61 85% 0%
Biomass 61 75% 8%1
Oil 64 0%
Wind onshore 86 30% 15%1
Wind oshore 124 40% 15%
Small hydro 129 60% 8%
Solar CSP 165 38% 10%1
Solar PV 232 20% 20%1
Table 2: Data used as a base for the analysis. 1 from Neij [2009].
go down either because of the level of maturity of this technology and because the cost of large hydropower
plant is largely location specic.
Finally, it is assumed that the installed capacity at the end of 2009 [REN21, 2010] is a good proxy for
the cumulative installed capacity of the various technologies considered at the beginning of the analysis.
4 Results and discussion
Table 3 summarizes the costs of each scenario. The total cost for each scenario is the share of the
cumulated GDP needed to ll the gap between the locked-in power and the total primary energy supply
overtime.
Business as usual Nuclear Renewable energy
Technology Cost Share 2050
TPES
Cost Share 2050
TPES
Cost Share 2050
TPES
Coal 1.3% 33.1% - - - -
Crude oil 1.0% 17.1% - - - -
Natural gas 1.1% 19.7% - - - -
Nuclear 0.3% 7.1% 0.8% 21.8% - -
Large hydro 0.2% 3.0% 0.2% 3.0% 0.2% 3.0%
Small hydro 0.2% 1.0% 0.3% 1.4% 0.3% 1.4%
Biomass 0.2% 3.9% 0.7% 18.1% 0.7% 18.1%
Geothermal 0.1% 3.6% 0.1% 3.6% 0.1% 3.6%
Solar PV 0.2% 1.5% 1.7% 21.9% 2.2% 32.5%
Solar CSP 0.1% 1.2% 0.8% 12.2% 1.2% 20%
Onshore wind power 0.4% 5.0% 0.7% 11.0% 0.7% 11%
Oshore wind power <0.1% 0.7% 0.2% 3.8% 0.3% 7.3%
Total 5.09% 96.78% 5.35% 96.78% 5.68% 96.78%
Table 3: Cost of the three scenario for the selected technologies and their contribution to the TPES in
2050 (in %).
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Pursuing the renewable energy scenario would cost an extra 0.6% of the cumulated global GDP between
2009 and 2050 compared to the cost of the business as usual scenario, whereas the cost of the nuclear
scenario reduces this gap in cost by half. Part of this dierence in costs can be traced to the rather
extensive use of solar PV in the renewable energy and the nuclear scenarios, with the LCOE of solar PV
not expected to go below 60 Euro/MWh in any scenario.
The dierence in total cost between the scenarios may appear limited and this seemingly low cost
of going fully renewable is mainly the result of two factors. First, the business as usual scenario also
relies on renewable energy generating technologies to some extent (13% of the TPES in 2050). From the
approach chosen to forecast future LCOE costs, the rst units installed are the most expensive. Because
less renewable capacity is installed in the business as usual scenario than in the other two, it is the
scenario where renewable energy will be the most expensive per MWh produced. The second factor is
that fossil-based technologies are not subject to learning, whereas the other technologies are. By the end
of the scenarios, it means that some renewable technologies get cheaper than some of the fossil-based
technologies. For instance, wind power and biomass are expected to be competitive with natural gas by
the end of all three scenarios.
It is clear that there is more uncertainty in the long term than in the short term. For instance, the
occurrence or not of the oil peak during the period considered brings uncertainty in the future fossil fuel
costs. The real future costs of renewable energy generating technologies in forty years can also be debated
at length. These two elements will be discussed further with the help of sensitivity analyses in the next
section.
4.1 Sensitivity analysis
Pressures on fossil-fuel prices will be stronger in the business-as-usual scenario than in the other two. Yet,
fuel prices were assumed to be escalating at the same rate in all scenarios, because future fuel prices are
very uncertain. A higher escalation rate, due to diminishing fossil reserves for example, reduces the gap
in costs between the three scenarios and can even make the business as usual scenario less attractive than
the other scenarios (see Fig. 5a). The opposite case where fossil fuel prices would decrease is possible
too, provided that unconventional fossil fuels are developed substantially, in which case the gap in costs
between the scenarios would increase.
Diminishing learning rates overtime were introduced to incorporate the fact that learning is tougher
to obtain in the long run. The overall costs of the three scenarios as a share of the cumulated GDP over
the period 2009-2050 are reproduced in Fig. 5b for rates at which learning diminishes ranging from 5%
to 15%. Fig. 5b indicates that the business as usual scenario is the least preferred scenario if a low rate
at which learning diminishes applies. The other two scenarios rapidly become more expensive as this rate
increases. Taken together, the sensitivity analysis indicate that the incremental cost of opting for the
renewable energy scenario over the business as usual scenario could be between 0.4% and 1.5% of the
cumulated GDP. These results are in line with the ndings of more sophisticated models [Edenhofer et
al., 2006].
5 Concluding remarks
This study produced an attempt to estimate whether we can aord to replace fossil-fuels with other energy
sources. The approach chosen to address this important issue relies on a comparative static exercise of
three scenarios representing dierent plausible futures. Endogenous learning rates for each technology
have been modeled using a traditional single factor experience curve combined with diminishing learning
rates. Our analysis shows that opting for the renewable energy scenario over the business as usual scenario
would cost between -0.4 and 1.5% of the cumulated GDP and that using nuclear energy can reduce this
dierence in costs.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis for dierent escalation rates of the fuel prices.
Two sensitivity analyses were provided to illustrate how the nal cost of a scenario evolves if important
initial assumptions are changed. On one hand, it was shown that the gap in costs between the business as
usual scenario and the renewable energy scenario is reduced if increasing fossil-fuel costs are introduced.
On the other hand, augmenting the rate at which learning diminishes will make the latter scenario
nancially less attractive. Some aspects have been omitted in this study due to the absence of recognized
methods to estimate their costs. The externality costs resulting from the use of various energy sources
and the potential costs emanating from climate change [IPCC, 2011, Mideksa, 2010, Stern, 2007] and air
pollution [Bollen, 2009] are not included in the business as usual scenario. Conversely, the cost of treating
for intermittency and non-dispatchability issues, the cost of transforming electricity into a valuable fuel for
the transportation sector, the cost of land area allocation and the cost associated to the construction of the
infrastructure needed for storing energy and transporting electricity have not been included in the nuclear
and the renewable energy scenarios. These categories of costs are however likely to be compensated to
some extent by similar existing costs in the fossil sector. These aspects are nonetheless important and can
impact the nal cost of each scenario. Another important issue not incorporated in any of the scenarios is
the possibility of technological breakthroughs which would open for the large scale exploitation of a new
or an existing energy resource at a lower cost than existing technologies.
Overall, within the assumptions given in this study, the cost dierence between the various scenarios is
'small'. However, the renewable path clearly requires a long term global political commitment in order to
achieve the deployment needed to allow for a signicant reduction in the cost of the renewable technologies
via learning. This global political commitment may prove infeasible when confronted with the 'need' for
short term economical growth. In this perspective, the initial investments needed to bring down the total
cost of the renewable scenario may become too expensive for many countries.
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